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An Empirical Analysis of Factors That Distinguish
Those Who Evade on Their Tax Return from Those
Who Choose not to File a Return
Steven E. Crane ' and Farrokh Nourzad"
Abstract
This paper presents an empirical model distinguishing evaders who cheal by filing
fra udulelll jncome tax relurnsfrom those who do nOlftle. Using a maximum-likelihood
procedure that corrects for sample selection bias, and data from Michigan's amnesty
prog ram, we estimate a linear probability model which relates the probability oifi/jng

to various econom ic and demographic characteristics. The results indicate that higher
{rue income and ou/omaric withholding raise the probability o/filing, while males and

single indil,iduaJs are less likely 10 file. The evidence regarding a grouping of occupatiolls often thought to he associated with evasion is inconclusive.

I. Introduction

Income tax evasion is a widely recognized and growing problem that costs governments throughout the world a great deal of revenue. In the United States. the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) has estimated that the annual shortfall in income tax revenue due
to evas ion exceeds $ 100 billi on. A portion of this is by indi viduals who file fraudulent
returns that underreport their true tax obligation. Another portion of the tax gap is
attributable to the estimated 9.8 million who do nol fi le tax returns al all.
In rece nt years we have learned a great deal from both theoretical and empirical
analyses of a taxpayer' s decision to underreport his or her income (Cowell. 1990). In
contrast, we know very little abou t nonfi lers. This is partly because data avai lability
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proble ms are morc formi dable: Iiltl e infomlalio n conccming nonfil ers ca n be produced
1
because 11 0 records ex ist. In uddilion. there is liule theoreti cal guid<.tnce concerning lhi s
group. In conventi onal mic rolheorc lic evasion models nonfi lers represent come r solutions thaI are c;s:;piicitly ruled OUI so thaI comparati ve stati cs analysis can be performed
on interior solut ions that ren ee! underreporting.
While fa nnal mode ls of non fil ers have only recently begun 10 appear in the
Ulerature (e.g .. Yaniv . 1988). some progress can still be made at the empiri cal level. The
growing popularity o f income lax amnes ty programs otTers a n opportunity to address
the data avai lab ility problem. The experience in the U.S. indicates that amnesty partic i.
pants include not only income underrc portcrs but also non filers , many of whom were
not otherwise known to the lax authoriti es. Thi s mean s that, in pri nciple, one can use
data gene rated from amnesty programs to study tax evasion by underreportcrs and
non fil ers.
In practice. however, one is faced with certain limitations and complications.
Because ma ny a mnesty programs are has tily put together with little advanced planning
fo r subseque nt research, the data are often limited in tenns o f both quality and quantity.
Moreover, special econometric procedures are needed to deal with the complications
caused by the se lf-se lected nature of amnesty data.
Elsewhere, we have studied the problem of income tax evasion at the indiv idua l
level using data from tax amnesty programs offered by Cali fornia and Michigan (Crane
and Nourzad, 1990, 1992). Both sl.udies foc used on testing certain comparative statics
propositions derived from microtheoretic mode ls of income tax e vasion. Because of
thi s, we concentrated exclusive ly on partkipants who were amending their original
re turns under amnesty. In other words, we discarded the observations on individuals
who had not filed an orig inal return but came forth under amnesty and vol ulllaril y
provided infonnation about their status for the year in question. Si nce nonfilers made up
the majority of the samples. our prev ious work did not fully ex ploit the infonnalion
available from these amnesty programs.
In the present paper we use a sample of both types of parti cipants in lIle Michigan
tax amnesty program to identify certai n economic and demographic factors that disti n·
guish non file rs from underreporters. The results provide infomlation regarding how
these characteristics affectlhe probabi lity that an evader chooses to be a nonfiler rather
than an income underreporter. This in fomtation may be useful for developing a profile
of those who o pt to remain outside the tax system. and for designing polic ies to ind uce
these indi viduals to e nte r the system.
Of course. thi s information still re presents only an add itional piece of the overall
tax evasion puzzle. A tru ly comple te analy sis wou ld require an extreme ly ri ch data SCI,
one that wou ld include not only informati on about the cheaters exami ned in this paper.
but a lso comple te ly honest taxpayers. With such data, one could examine me seque ntia l
process from the initi al decision to cheat or nOl. through me decis ion regarding me fonn
of c heating (Le., not filing vs. filin g a fraudulen t return). Unfortunately , a data set of this
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richness has never been assembled, and it is unlikely that it ever will be, since it would
require a highly improbable level of cooperation (and honesty) from aJl group s.2
In lhe absence of this ideal data set, researchers must be content to focu s on one or

more pieces of the puzzle. Most research has focused on samples such as those from the
.IRS Tax Co mpliance Measurement Program. which allow one to di stingui sh between
"honest" and dishonest filers, but contain no information o n the Doofiling population.
OUf work uses a sample of lax amnesty data on dishonest individuals that allows us to
examine the nalure of the dishonesty. By combining the information that emerges from
these separate approaches, analysts should be able to move closer to tiUing in the
complete tax compliance picture.
The organization of the paper is as follow s: In the next section we describe some
econometric issues concerning the use of amnesty data for analyzing tax evasion. In
section [1]. we describe o ur empirical model. In secti on IV, we present and di scuss our
estimation results. The paper ends with a section summarizing thi s work and di scussing
some policy implications.

II. The Econometrics of Analyzing Tax Amnesty Data
Analyzing evasion using amnesty data calls for special econometric procedures to
deal with the potential bias caused by the self-selected nature of the sample . Thi s
requires modeling not only the initial decision to evade, but al so the subsequent deci sion
to participate in the amnesty program.

The Filing Decision
The evader's decision regarding the form his or her evasion will take can be
modeled as follows. Let Yi = I if the ith individual evades by filing a lax return that
underreports his or her true taxable income and Yj = 0 if he or she is a nonfiler. Denote
by Xi the vector of the factors that affect the indi vidual' s decision to file or not and let B
be a vector of unknown parameters. Suppose the probability that Y; = I is F (Xi, P), in
which case Prob (Yi = 0) = I - F (Xi, P ). For estimation purposes, the main question is
how to specify F (Xi, P). U we assume F (Xi. Il ) =Xi p, we have the linear probability
model (LPM),
Y;= X; ~ + u ;

( I)

"i

cr.

where is a rando m error tenn with mean 0 and variance
On the other hand. if we
let F (Xi. P) be the cumul ative standard nonnal (logistic) distribution functi on. we ha ve
the probit (Iogit) model.
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Our task would be quite easy if we had a truly random sample. Most standard
eco nometrics programs have buill-in routi nes fo r estimating these disc rete choice model s. A sample of amnesty panicipanls, however. is not e nt irely random because amnesty
fil ers themselves decided to be in the program. As a result , the parameter est imates from
any of the above model s are likely to suffer fro m bias unless the participation decision
is incorporated into the model.

The Parficiplllion Decision
In many applications. correcting for self-selection bias can be accompli shed by
using the two-step procedure developed by Heckman (1979). In this approach the
partici pati on decision equation is expressed as,
(2)

t; = Z,y -

E,

where r, is a latent variable which represents the propensity to partIcIpate m the
program, Zi is the vector of factors affecting the participation decision. y is a vector of
unknown parameters, and ti is a random error tenn with mean zero and variance 1.

'i

Since t; is unobservable. the standard procedure is to defi ne = I if and only if t; > 0
and ,; = 0 otherwise, and to use it as the left-hand-side variable in equation (2). In the
first step of the Heckman procedure, equation (2) is est imated by probiL Using the
resulting estimated parameters, a correction factor (the Inverse Mills Ratio) is constructed and used in lhe second step as an additional regressor in the base model,
equation ( I ).
The type of sample se lection that is assoc iated with amnesty data is a spec ial case
that cannot be treated by thi s meth od. The prob lem is that amnesty samples are
truncated in that we only observe those who participate in the programs and have no
informat'ion on those who do not ; that is, we observe Yi • Xi. and Zi onl y if , ; = I. We
cannot use the Heckman two-step procedure since in the firsl step the parameter vector
of the participation function. y. cannot be estimated. An alternat ive sample-selection
correction procedure for incorporating the participat ion decision is needed for amnesty
samples.

Correcting/or Sample-Selection Bias ill Amnesty Dtlla
Bloom and Killingsworth (1985). Maddala ( 1983). and Muthen and Joreskog
(1983) have developed procedures that can be used for correct ing se lf-select ion bias in
truncated samples. In contrast to Heckman's Iwo-step approach. theirs is a one-step
estimation procedure which involves maximizing a likelihood function Ihat integrates
informalion about the base deci sion of interest and the related deci sion to participate.

110

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYS IS OF TAX EVASION FACTORS

This procedure, which assumes the base deci sion is modeled as a conventional linear
regression, can be used here provided the filin g decision is specified as the LPM shown
in eq uation (I). On the other hand. if the base decision is spec ified as a probil (Iogit)
model, then the issue is more complicated.
In this paper we report results using a linear probability model for the fi ling
decision while correcting for self·selection bias usi ng the one-step approach mentioned
above. This in volves maximizing the likelihood function,
(3)

n ,[<I> (2,1)

rl ( 1/ cr) exp [- ( 112 cr' )(Y, - Xi ~)' J

• <I> It 2,1- (p/ cr )(Y,-X,

P)]lt (I -

p'

il2 ))

where <P (.) is the cumulative distribution function and p is the correlati on coefficient
between U j and Ej, the error terms in the fi ll ing decision eq uation ( I) and the partic i pa ~
tion equation (2), respecti vely. All other notations are as defined previously.
Maximi zing (3) addresses the se lf-se lection issue as follows. The fact that n o npar~
ticipants are not represented in the sample means that a portion of the overall di stribu tion is mi ssing. As a result. standard estimation procedures produce coe fficients whose
means are nol centered on the true parameter value. Further, the missing portion of the
distribution means that the area under the density function does not sum to one, thereby
invalidating the usual hypothesis tests. Equati on (3) "correc ts" for these probl ems by
incorporating infonnat ion about the deci sion to parti cipate, and using it to re-scale the
distribution for participants. This re-scaling re-centers the estimators, and assures that
the area under the distribution curve sums to one.
In addition to correcting for the sample-selection bias, thi s maximum-likelihood
procedure has the advantage that the resulting in verse Hessian matrix yields correct
asymptotic standard errors. Thu s, we avoid the problem caused by heteroscedasticity
when the model implied by (3 ) is estimated by nonlinear least squares.

111. The Empirical Model
In this section we specify an empirical model fo r analyzing the effect of variou s
socia-economic fac tors on an evader's choice between filin g a fraudulent tax return and
not filing. We begin by describing the data used in the analysis. Next. we present our
empi rical coun terpart of the filing dec ision equation ( I) followed by that of the participation decision equation (2).

The Sample
The data used in thi s study are taken from the tax amnesty database constructed by
the Michigan Treasury Department. 3 The ori gi nal data set contai ned infonnation taken
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from 4.203 returns. 2.985 of which pertained to individual income laKes. Of these, 588

were fil ed by indi viduals who were amending a relurn and 2.397 were by individua ls
who had nOI filed previously fo r the year in question .
The sample used in the present study is a subset of the individual income lax
amnesty returns. It consists o f 1.748 returns filed under amnesty. or these. 213 amended

a return and J .535 were "new" returns by indiv iduals who had not filed previously for
the year in question. This subsample is the result of an extensive data evaluation/verification process in which data were checked for intern al consistency. missing observa-

tions. and the like.

Factors Affecting ,he Filing Decision
Given the lim ited theoretical gu idance concerning lhe fi le/no-file decision. our
specification of the filling dec ision is based largely on intuition and data availability.
We use a num be r of variables as potential discriminants between underreporters and
nonfilers. One such variable is the individual' s true income. For this we use adjusted
gross in come as reponed on the amended retum. 4 We also control fo r differences in the
opportunity to evade. First. we account fo r the impact of automat.ic tax withholding.
Second, we identify indi viduals with certain occupati ons that are suspected to have
higher opponunities to evade, We also dislinguish between the two groups of evaders
based on two demographic characteristics. gender and marital statu s.
We speci fy our empirical version of equation ( I) as follows,
r ,= Ilo+ ~ , AGJ, + j}, IVrrHHEW, + ~3 OCCUPATN,+
(4)

~,MALE,+~s MARRJED,+ II,

where Y; is a dummy variable thal equal s I if the individual is an income underreporter
and 0 if he or she is a nonfiler: AGI is the indi vidual' s true adj usted gross income;
WITHHELD is a dununy vari able that is I if any income had been withheld and 0
otherwise : OCCUPATN is a dummy variable whk h eq uals I if the indi vidual 's occupation is one or more of the follo wing: self-emp loyed, saJes, fann ing. foods and beverages. construction. and personal services: MALE is a dummy variable lhat takes the
value I if the indi vidual is male and 0 olherwise; and MARR/ED is a dummy variable
identi fy ing married individuals.

FaClors Affectillg (he Panicipatioll Decision
In specifying our empirical version of the participation decision equation (2), we
draw on the recent work by Aim and Beck (199 1) and by Fisher, Goddeeris, and Young
(1989). They emphasize the importance of perceplions about increases in penaJty and
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the detection probabi lity that occur after amnesty . We postulate that the perceived
increase in the detecti on probab il ity post-amnesty is related to expec tati ons regarding
the subsequent enforcement regime.
We contro l fo r this factor in three ways. First. we identify certain types of income
that are more likely 10 attract attention. Second, we make use of the facl that Lhe
Michigan Department of Treasury planned to target the returns of professionals who
were licensed by the Slale. Th ird. we identify the return s of evaders who might have
feared they had been uncovered either through IRS audits or the Michi gan Treasury
Department doc ume nlmatching programs.
We complete our specification of the partic ipation function by controlli ng for a
nonpecuniary inOuence (Fisher, Goddeeri s and Young, 1989). We identi fy the mnnesty
retu rns that were accompanied by a special letler of expl anati on from the individual
concerning hi s or her filing for amnesty. Given that the amnesty provisions required no
s uch explanat ion, thi s leiter mi ght indicate that the individual felt some degree of guilt
or remorse.
We thus specify the following participation decis ion eq uation,

r, = Yo + Y, RENTROYL, + y, LICENSED, + y, lRSAUDIT, +
(5)

Y4 LE7TER, + y, GUILT, - E,

where t; is the latent variable representing the propensity 10 participate in the amneslY
program: RENTROYL is a dummy variable that equals I if the indi vidual' s income
incl udes rents. royalties. or business income: LICENSED is a dummy variable thai
ind icates whether the individual is licensed by the state for practice in one or more of the
follow ing fie lds: architecture, medicineihealLh, law, personal serv ices, and transportation: IRSAUDIT is a dummy variab le that is equal to I if the parti cipant was under
audit by the IRS prior to or during the amnesty program: LE7TER is a dummy variable
that takes the value I if the individual was sent a letter by the Mi chigan Department of
Treasury inquiring why he or she had filed a federa l return but had fai led to fi le a sta te
return ; and CUILTis a dummy variable indi cating returns fi led under amnesty that were
accompanied by a le iter of explanation.
RecaJlthat the filin g decision equation (4) and the participation equation (5) are not
estimated separately; they are integrated into the likel ihood function (3) which is then
maximized. This yields unbiased estimates for ps in equatio n (4), but the estimates ofy.;.
in equation (5) are unreliable (MaddaJa, 1983). In Ijghl of thi s. we focus exclusively on
the parameters of the filing eq uati on.
While the sign of the income coefficient ultimately depends upon risk attitudes,
intuition suggests one might expect a positi ve coeffi cien t. As one's income rises. it
becomes increas ingly difficult to avoid leav ing trails for the tax authorities to fo llow.
Moreover. opportunjti es to engage in legal tax avoidance increase with income. Therefore, as income ri ses those who decide to evade are more li ke ly to do so on the return
rather than by not filing. Along the same lines, we expect the withholding variable 10
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have a posi tive coefficient. This caprures the fact thai the in dividual was known to the
authorities as hav ing earned income that mig ht be taxabl e.
Turning to the occupation variable. it is difficult to fonn a clear-cut sign expectatio n. Although it is generally agreed thai people in these occupations have mo rc
opportunities to evade, there is no consensus as to what Conn their evasion takes. Some
of these occupations may provide the opponu nity not to file at all . whereas others offer
the individ ual various ways to misstate differen t items on his or her return. This
uncertai nt y is compounded by the fac t that the model already cOnlains the wi thholding
vari able which pan iall y control s for the opportu nity nOI 10 fi le. T hus OCCUPATN

captures only the effect of the incremental opponunity nOl to file, above and beyond thai
avai lab le in Ihe absence of automatic wi thho lding.
As for the marital status variable. we ex pect it to have a posi tive coefficient because
it is more like ly that two people leave traceable impact in the economy. Finally. we have
no sign expectation on the gender variable.

IV. Estimation Results
The max imum-likelihood (ML) resuhs are reponed in Table l. For comparison
purposes. we ha ve also incl uded resuhs from estimating the filing decis ion model by
ordinary least squares (OLS) which does not correct for sample se lection.

Table I
aLS Eslim:ues"

ML Estimates·
Codf

,· Ral

p-Val

Coeff

I-Rat

p-Val

0.843

2.526
1.726

0.012
0.084

5..l95

0.000

2.095
4 .738
10.324

0.000
0.000

0.3 11
0.005

" .003

· 1.014
-2.832
3.625
- 1.528
0.438
..0.028

0.035
0.035
0.157
·0.008

GUILT

5.043
·0.424
1.235

- 1.084
1.276

a
P

0.3 \7
-0.566

4. 116
- 1.807

CONSTANT I
AG I
WITHH ELD
OCCUPATN
MALE
MARRIED
CONSTANT2
RENTROYL
LICENSED
IRSAUDIT
Ll::TrER

0.0 13
0.1 16
-0.021
·0.055
0.059
-4.426
5.273

LOGLKUIOOD

0.852

· 149.650

• With sample-selection correction.

0.000

0.036

0.694

-oms

·0.393

-4.250

0.000

0.074

3.953

0.001

0. 126
0.662
0.978
0.394
0.278
0.202

0.000
0.Q71
-397.039
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Consider first the ML results, The estimated coefficient of the income variable is

positive and significant althe 8% level. s Thi s indicates thai evaders are more likely to
file as true income increases. wh ich suggests thm nonfilers are morc like ly \0 be low
income indi vidual s.6 The estimated coefficient of the withholding dummy variable is
pos iti ve and highly significant. implying that the probabili ty thai an evader is a Ilonfiler
decreases if the indi viduaJ is subjecllo with ho ldin g.

Turning

the occupation variable. we observe that its estimated coefficie nt is
negative. although not stati stically s ignificant at convention al levels. It may be that the
occupatio nal grouping used to construct this variable is 100 broad. Or it may be thallhe
10

opposing effects mentioned earlier cance l each other out On the other hand , after
con trollin g for the effect of withho lding, there may be little incremental opportunity not
to file associated with these occupati ons. In fact, when the model was rc-estimated
without WITHHELD, the estimated coeffi cie nt of OCCUPATN remained negative but
became highly stati stically significant.
Finally, consider lhe two demographic variables. BOIh have statistica lly significant
effects on the prohahil.ity of fil ing. Males are more likely to be nonfil ers. wherea s
married individua ls are more like ly 10 evade by filin g fraud ulen t returns.
We conclude our disc ussion o f the ML re sull s by noting that the esti mated standard
error of the filing equation , cr, and the estimated correlation coefficien t betwcen the
error tenns, p. are both statistically significan t al reasonable leve ls. The laller result is
of particular interest because it suggests that our attempt [0 model the panicipati on
decis ion has met with some success. We can get a sense of the impact of the se lection
bias on the esti mated parameters of the filin g decision equation by comparing the ML
estimates with the OLS result s.
This comparison indicates that the two sets of results are similar in tenns of s igns
and significa nce. 1 As far as magni tudes of these estimates are concerned. the mos t
notable difference is the coeffi cient o f income . The ML estimate o f this parameter is
considerably smaller (han its OLS counterpart, both in absolute tenns and relative to the
other stati stically s igni ficant parameters. Thi s may be important for developing an
accurate profile o f nonfilers.

V. Concluding Remarks
In thi s paper we demonstrated how amnesty data can be used to study tax evasion.
Using data from the amnesty program by the slate of Michigan , we specified and
estimated a model that examined the effect of economic and demographic factors on
probabili ty of filin g a fra udulent income tax return versus not filing at ai L In doing so,
we employed a max imum li ke lihood procedure that corrects fo r the sample selection
bias in the data.
We lind that there is a positive correlation between the leve l of income and the
probabil ity of fi ling. An imp lication of thi s is that, despite the large number of nonfilcrs
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in the population at large, the potential return to compl iance efforts directed toward
these individuals may be limited. However, if for reasons other than reven ue gene rati on
it is des irable 10 bring nonfilers into the lax system, the n au tomatic withhold ing appears
to be an effect ive enforcement tool. Thi s is suggested by the very strong positi ve
correlation that we find between withholdi ng and !.he probability of filing.
In contrast. we are unable to establ ish a link between nonfiling and a grouping of
occupatio ns oflen tho ught to be associated with evasion. Thus targeting these occupations as a way of reducing nonfili ng behavior may not be an effecti ve compliance
policy. Perhaps being subjecllo automatic tax withholding constrains the opportunity to
be a nonfil er whi ch typi cally provides the rationale for targeting these occupations. In
fact, gender or maritaJ status appears to be a better d iscriminant of nonfiling than
occupation since we find that maJes and single indi vidual s are more likely Lo be
nonfilers.
The analysis reported in this paper can be extended and improved in several ways.
First. give n the weak perfonnance of the occupati on variable. it would be wise to
re-examine this issue using more detailed occupational groupings. Second , in order to
gain ins igln into poss ible diffe rences between the behav ior of re peated and single-year
evaders, control shou ld be made for the returns of multiple-year amnesty fi lers. A third ,
yet related. issue is that there are two types of nonfilers: those for whom there is some
previous record and those for whom no such record exists. Di stingui shing between
these two groups may be relevant for both the base equation and the partic ipation
equation. Fourth, we have paid no attention to characteristics of the returns themselves.
It may be that the degree of co mplexity of the individuar s return has some impact on
the file/no file decision. Finally. experimentation with alternative econometric approaches to estimating the base equation should be undertaken. Estimation using probit,
logit. or perhaps even a lobi t speci fication should provide an indication of the robustness of the estimates.

Noles
t. Data pe rt aining 10 income undcrreponers can be ge neraled from a number o f sources including special
audi t programs such as the IRS Tax Compliance Measureme nt Program. Te MP.
2. Without complete honeslY. il would be \'cry difficu[tlO distingu ish honest filers from dishonest ones.
At best, ~ honest " wou ld be defined as those who successfull y wilhslood a comprehensive audit, which slill
misses the most sophisticated evaders. W it hout full honesty. it would be vcry difficul t 10 identifycv!KIers who
are non fi lers. At best some of Ihe nonfilers could be identified through a massive eITon to follow any "l.IOCes"
these indi viduals mi~ht have left in the tux system (c.g .. a previous return. wilhholding. elc.). while missi ng
the nonfilers wh o had left no traces to fo llow.
3. The progra m. whic h lasted from May [2 through June 300f 1986. covered all fonns of state tax~s. Fo r
more on the Michigan amnesty program see Bowman and Manin (1987. [988) and Fisher. Goddeens, and
Young ( t989).
.
4 . ln us ingamneslY data. our assumption is that the relurn filed under amnesly IS fi lled out truthfully.
5 . Prior 10 esti mation the inco me variable was standaTdized in o rder to improve the conve rgence
propertIes o f the model.
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6. In facl, in our sample the mean val ue of AGI for the non filers is $20.842, whereas that of the
underreporters is $52.93 1.
7. We also eSlimaied the fili ng decision equation by probit and obtained resulls which were virtually
identical qualitatively \0 the OLS results.
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